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Abstract
This paper develops a joint evaluation of vocational training and unemployment in-
surance. This allows to analyze how these schemes complement each other from the
viewpoints of labor market indicators and of welfare. For this purpose, a general
equilibrium matching model is built where workers are heterogeneous and risk averse.
Heterogeneity allows to look at the distribution of the eﬀects. Job search eﬀort and
wages are endogenous in order to deal with the induced eﬀects of these schemes. The
net eﬀect of these training programs appears to be gloomy. However, their impact
on employment can be deeply aﬀected by the design of passive policies. A declining
time proﬁle of beneﬁt payments dominates a scheme with a constant replacement ra-
tio. However, the optimal expected length of payment of ‘high’ beneﬁts can vary a
lot in the population. A reform that would relate this expected duration to search
eﬀort does not appear to produce substantial eﬀects on any of the evaluation criteria.
Performance indicators of the labor market and welfare criteria often vary in oppo-
site directions after a reform. This questions the widespread focus on labor market
indicators to guide the design of institutional reforms.
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Most countries simultaneously use a mix of ‘passive’ and ‘active’ labor market policies to
tackle often pervasive unemployment problems, especially for the low-skilled. Reforms are
urgently called for by international institutions. Reforms can however have very diﬀerent
eﬀects according to the criterion used to evaluate them. Moreover, since the labor force
is heterogeneous, the distribution of the impact should be preferred to an average eﬀect.
This paper deals with four questions. First, to what extent should unemployment beneﬁts
decline with unemployment duration when the unemployment pool is made of groups with
diﬀerent intrinsic probabilities of exit to a job? Second, following the recent literature
about sanctions, should there be a relationship between the time-proﬁle of unemployment
beneﬁts and the level of search eﬀort? Third, since training the unemployed simultaneously
reduces ﬁrms’ training cost, raises wages, aﬀects participation decisions and is relatively
costly, to what extent should training programs be developed in addition to unemployment
insurance? Fourth, is it always true that “the more generous are passive unemployment
policies, the less eﬀective will be active unemployment policies” (Coe and Snower, 1997,
p. 22)?
To deal with these questions, this paper develops a general equilibrium model based on
a matching framework where individuals are risk averse, search eﬀort and participation are
endogenous and wages are bargained over (Pissarides, 2000). Workers are heterogeneous in
two dimensions: Their skill and their utility when inactive. To the best of my knowledge,
this model generalizes previous ones (see below). The paper develops both analytical
results and simulation exercises for a country plagued with a pervasive unemployment
problem for low-skilled individuals.
The related literature is quite large. Due to space limitation, it is only possible to
present a selective and highly condensed review of some contributions.1 After a lot of
research in partial equilibrium (e.g. Shavell and Weiss, 1979, Wang and Williamson, 1996,
and Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997), the design of unemployment insurance schemes has
recently been studied in equilibrium search models with wage bargaining by Cahuc and
Lehmann (2000), Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) and Coles and Masters (2001). By
carefully developing a strategic wage bargain between an individual job seeker and a ﬁrm,
the latter focus on the relationship between the proﬁle of duration dependent UI payment
schemes and the level of wages. Assuming automatic renegotiation of individual wages and
adopting a utilitarian criterion, Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) show that a declining
time proﬁle of beneﬁts dominates an insurance system characterized by indeﬁnite payment
of a constant replacement ratio if there is no discounting. With discounting, whether the
sequencing of beneﬁts should or not be declining remains an unsettled issue. A numerical
analysis by Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) concludes that the wage pressure eﬀect of
1A wide range of labor market policies and ﬁscal policies related to this market have recently been
studied in general equilibrium settings (see e.g. Heckman, Lochner and Taber, 1999, Mortensen and
Pissarides, 1999, Bassanini, Rasmussen and Scarpetta, 1999, Taber, 2000, Boone and Bovenberg, 2001,
and Manning, 2001). This overview does not justice to this literature.
1declining unemployment beneﬁts (emphasized by Cahuc and Lehmann, 2000) is not strong
enough to compensate the eﬀect of a declining beneﬁt sequence on search incentives.
When the wage bargain is centralized, Kreiner and Whitta-Jacobsen (2002) have recently
challenged the main result of Cahuc and Lehmann (2000) under the assumption that
the incidence of long-term unemployment increases with aggregate unemployment. The
present paper will revisit this literature in a generalized framework with active schemes.
In the recent past, a new branch of the literature has looked at the eﬀects of sanctions.
Sanctions are reductions or withdrawals of unemployment beneﬁts due to some misconduct
of the unemployed (see Grubb, 2001). Insuﬃcient search for a job is the main example
considered in the recent literature. Boadway and Cuﬀ (1999), Boone and van Ours (2000)
and Boone, Fredriksson, Holmlund and van Ours (2002) are major contributions to this
literature. The broad message is that sanctions are eﬀective to enhance search eﬀort and
that so doing they allow to insure the unemployment risk more eﬃciently. Sanctions can
be seen as a particular mechanism by which the sequencing of beneﬁts is declining. The
speciﬁcity comes from the role played by the (imperfect) observation of search eﬀorts
on the rate at which beneﬁts decline. Hence, it seems natural to merge the literature
about the optimal sequencing of beneﬁts and the one about sanctions by allowing for a
dependency between the proﬁle of unemployment beneﬁts and the level of search.
Active programs have been studied by Holmlund and Lind´ en (1993) who highlight the
wage-push eﬀect of direct job creation schemes for the unemployed (also called ‘relief jobs’).
Calmfors and Lang (1995) added that these policies enhance or at least maintain eﬀective
labor-force participation in the presence of negative duration dependence. Masters (2000)
introduces retraining programs for the unemployed in an equilibrium matching framework.
These programs improve the matching eﬀectiveness of the unemployed. Participation into
a training program is decided by the unemployed. Assuming risk-neutral workers without
credit constraints, Masters (2000) shows that the government should let the unemployed
pay for the program under free entry of vacancies and in the absence of any ‘hold-up’
problem. Albrecht, van den Berg and Vroman (2002) evaluates a one-year program that is
seen as enhancing the level of skills of the unemployed. In these two papers, search eﬀort
in unemployment is unaﬀected by the existence of the program. Moreover, the issue of
complementarities between passive and active programs is not considered.
Another literature tries to assess possible complementarities between labor market
policies and institutions. The empirical literature is quite large (see Nickell and Layard
for a summary and Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000, Belot and van Ours, 2001, or Bertola,
Blau and Kahn, 2001, for more recent contributions that focus on the interaction between
institutions and shocks). These papers typically estimate a reduced-form equation link-
ing an indicator of labor market performance to a set of explanatory factors inspired in
particular by ‘wage setting-price setting’ models. Theoretical analyses of complementar-
ities can be found in Coe and Snower (1997), L’Haridon (2001) and Burda and Weder
(2002).Van der Linden and Dor (2002) is a previous eﬀort to simultaneously study ‘active’
and ‘passive’ policies. Compared to that paper, the theoretical setting is here much more
2general.2 To the best of my knowledge, none of these articles has looked at the possible
complementarities between the sequencing of unemployment beneﬁts and training pro-
grams. Furthermore, except in L’Haridon (2001), the impact on welfare criteria has been
neglected.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model and the




This section develops a fairly general dynamic model that can simultaneously deal with
active and passive labor market policies in a general equilibrium setting with heterogeneous
agents. The model features a homogeneous good (the numeraire) and labor. The good
market is perfectly competitive. Returns to scale are constant. Each ﬁrm uses one and
only one type of skill. The labor market is therefore by assumption segmented in the skill
dimension.3 In the simulation exercise of Section 3, an aggregate budget constraint of the
State will introduce a link between the labor markets.
Diﬀerences in skill and in utility levels while inactive are the two sources of hetero-
geneity. For simplicity, a representative ﬁrm will be modeled for each skill. Each ﬁrm is
composed by ﬁlled and vacant occupations. Two levels of skill (l,h) will be introduced and
the distribution of utilities in inactivity will be uniformly distributed. Both assumptions
can be quite easily relaxed. To avoid non stationarity, several authors have assumed a
stochastic two-tired framework (see e.g. Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2001). As in these
papers, it will be assumed that (relatively) high beneﬁts expire at a rate π. An insured
unemployed whose high beneﬁts has expired enters a state where (s)he indeﬁnitely can
beneﬁt from a lower or equal unemployment beneﬁt.4 The latter could be an assistance
beneﬁt (Ortega and Rioux, 2002).
A markovian model is developed in a continuous-time setting and in steady state. It
distinguishes six states for each skill n. For jobless individuals, three states are identiﬁed :
Insured unemployment with high beneﬁts (Un), insured unemployment with low beneﬁts
(Xn) and training (Tn). ‘Employment’ should be understood as salaried employment. For
reasons that will shortly be clear, a distinction has to be made according to the origin of
those employed : En when coming directly from unemployment and ET,n when coming
2First, search eﬀort and participation decisions are endogeneized. Second, training programs do not
only improve the intertemporal position of the unemployed, leading to a wage-push eﬀect. These programs
also reduce the ﬁxed hiring cost for employers. Third, workers are risk averse and heterogeneous in skill.
Finally, a more comprehensive set of evaluation criteria is used here.
3This implies that the so-called ‘ladder eﬀect’ (or ‘job competition’) is by assumption ruled out (see
Gautier, 2002).
4It is in principle possible to extend this setting to a larger number of states each characterized by a
speciﬁc level of unemployment beneﬁts (see Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2001).
3from training programs. The sixth state, In, designates inactivity. These upper-case
symbols will simultaneously designate the states and the number of individuals occupying
them in steady state.
Training programs can be of diﬀerent types. This paper does not deal with programs
covering possibly several years and intending to be an alternative to formal education for
the unemployed.5 The present paper focuses instead on (relatively shorter) programs that
facilitate the acquisition of vocational skills. Such short programs cannot lift a worker
from the bottom of the skill distribution to the top. These training schemes are typically
organized by the Public Employment Service (‘PES’) or by specialized agencies. Heckman,
LaLonde and Smith (1999) summarize the conclusions of European evaluations of training
programs. They conclude that their impact on participants’ wages is negligible. Therefore,
it is sound to assume that participation into such schemes does not modify the productivity
of the worker. Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) also conclude that the case for positive
employment impacts is stronger. Hence, it is here assumed that participation into training
can have a positive eﬀect on matching eﬀectiveness (see below). In addition, hiring former
trainees lowers ﬁrms’ training cost. Consequently, since these vocational training programs
cannot be seen as an alternative to education, the skill composition of the population of
working age is kept exogenous. Pn,n∈{ l,h}, denotes the constant size of this population.
The model being markovian, the beneﬁt of training is lost as soon as the match ends.
Masters (2000) adopt a similar assumption. In that sense, unemployment is associated
with skill deterioration. Contrary to Acemoglu (1995) and Coles and Masters (2000),
no further loss of skill is however generated as the unemployment spell lengthens. This
assumption is motivated by the growing literature that shows that duration dependence
is largely spurious in Continental Europe (see Machin and Manning, 1999).
Firms open skill-speciﬁc vacancies accessible either to trainees or to the other job-
seekers. This assumption requires that participation to training programs is observable.
Due to various imperfections that are not explicitly introduced in the model, the matching
process is not instantaneous. So, the ﬂows of hires, Mn and MT,n, are a function of an
indicator of the number of job-seekers, Sn and ST,n, and of the number of vacancies, Vn
and VT,n. The matching functions are by assumption identical in all markets and they are
written respectively Mn = m(Sn,V n) and MT,n = m(ST,n,V T,n). The function m(.,.)i s
assumed to be increasing, concave and homogeneous of degree 1.
At each moment, the timing of decisions is by assumption the following:
1. Firms post vacancies and this costs a ﬁxed amount Kn per unit of time. Jobless
workers search for a job or stay out of the labor force.
2. The ﬁrm incurs a ﬁxed cost HT,n if the recruited worker has beneﬁted from a training
program and Hn otherwise (HT,n <H n). These match-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs include
training expenses.
5See for instance Albrecht, van den Berg and Vroman (2002).
43. Having Continental Europe in mind where collective bargaining is widespread and
following Cahuc and Lehmann (2000), it is assumed that the current wage is bar-
gained over by incumbent employees on behalf of all workers. At this stage, HT,n,H n
are a sunk cost.6 The fall-back level for theses ‘insiders’ is the intertemporal dis-
counted utility of an unemployed entering state Un.7
4. If an agreement is reached, production occurs and the total surplus is shared between
the worker and the ﬁrm.
5. An exogenous fraction φn of the matches is destroyed. The workers who occupied
these jobs enter insured unemployment8 and these jobs become vacant. As will soon
be clear, workers have no incentive to quit.
The behavior of jobless individuals could in principle be more complex. For, they could
decide to postpone searching for a job or to reject job oﬀers if entering a training program
was more rewarding. However, it will soon be clear that equally productive workers are
equally paid. For that reason, the behavior of jobless people consists in searching for a
job. It will also turn out that the intertemporal value in training lies between the one
in employment and the one in unemployment. So, entering a training program implies a
gain for the unemployed. However, waiting for a job oﬀer could be more advantageous.
Nevertheless, if an unemployed receives an oﬀer to enter a training scheme, the model
assumes that it will be accepted. This simplifying assumption is motivated by the fact that
in more and more countries refusing an active programs is a motive for being sanctioned.
As in Chapter 5 of Pissarides (2000), search intensity is endogenous. Here, it is speciﬁc
to each group. It is assumed that participants to training program can search for a job. Let
sU,n,s X,n and sT,n denote these intensities. Job-seekers can have skill-speciﬁc attributes
that inﬂuence their eﬃciency in the matching process and eventually their chosen level of
search eﬀort. A unique exogenous matching eﬀectiveness parameter cn will be associated
to states Un and Xn. For trainees, this parameter can be diﬀerent and will be denoted
cT,n.9 It is assumed that cT,n ≥ cn > 0. The rationale for this hypothesis is the following.
Perhaps because job-entry rates are unfortunately still used in the assessment of labor
programs, the PES can for instance give priority to participants to these programs, in
particular in the case of a closed treatment of job oﬀers.10 A signalling eﬀect of training
could also be invoked to motivate a speciﬁc matching eﬀectiveness parameter for the
6This creates a ‘hold-up’ problem. Since HT,n <H n, the latter is less acute when entrants exit from
training programs.
7In a one-ﬁrm-one-job setting, an alternative setting would be to assume that the initial wage (individu-
ally) negotiated when workers enter the ﬁrm is automatically renegotiated (see Fredriksson and Holmlund,
2001, and Coles and Masters, 2001, for a critique).
8This assumption is a good approximation for several countries but clearly not for all of them.
9In Masters (2000), this captures the beneﬁt of training for the unemployed.
10This refers to the case where the PES identiﬁes those who are suitable for vacancies in their register.
Cockx (2000) and Heckman, Heinrich and Smith (2002) emphasize the role of incentives on the behavior
of programs’ administrators.
5trainees. So, Sn ≡ cn(sU,nUn+ sX,n Xn) and ST,n ≡ cT,nsT,nTn. The distinction between
cn and cT,n is also a way to relax the assumption of identical matching functions.
Due to the constant returns to scale in the matching process, the model can be de-




ST,n. The rate at which vacant jobs become ﬁlled is q(θn) ≡ Mn/Vn =
m( 1
θn,1),q (θn) < 0 (respectively, q(θT,n) ≡ m( 1
θT,n,1)). An ‘eﬃcient job-seeker’ moves
into employment according to a Poisson process with rate α(θn) ≡
h(Sn,Vn)
Sn = θn q(θn),
with α (θn) > 0 (respectively, α(θT,n) ≡ θT,n q(θT,n)). Hence, an insured unemployed i
endowed with skill n and searching with a search intensity si
U,n ﬂows from unemployment
to employment at a rate to cn si
U,n α(θn). Similar expressions can easily be written for the
two other groups.
In the literature, the rate at which unemployment beneﬁts decrease is not a function
of the individual level of search intensity. There is however a growing literature about
sanctions that argues that allocative and risk-sharing eﬃciencies can be enhanced by
closely monitoring the search activity of the unemployed and by imposing sanctions in
case of a lack of search eﬀort. Following this literature, it is here assumed that the rate
(π) at which the ﬁrst period of high beneﬁts ends can be a function of sU,n. For simplicity,
let us take a linear relationship πn ≡ π0 −π1sU,n with π0 ≥ π1 ≥ 0.11 Boone, Fredriksson,
Holmlund and van Ours (2002) provide a rationale for such a speciﬁcation. In their paper,
unemployed people are monitored at a given rate (here, π0). Conditional on an inspection,
the rate of sanction is a linearly decreasing function of the observed level of search (here,
this rate is equal to 1−(π1/π0)sU,n). If π1 > 0, it is assumed that π0/π1 ≥ max[sU,l,s U,h].
The unemployed receive training oﬀers at a rate γn. A training program ends at an
exogenous rate λn. This parameter can be interpreted as the rate of failure of training
schemes. As it is observed in several countries, participation to active programs is a
suﬃcient condition to become eligible to high beneﬁts again. In general, the rate of entry
γn and the rate of exit λn could be diﬀerent according to the state of origin. However, due
to a lack of empirical evidence on such diﬀerences, it seems reasonable to assume common
rates. With the type of training programs considered in this paper, it is quite natural to
assume that λn ≥ φn,∀n.
Figure 1 summarizes the ﬂows in this economy.
In steady state, the ﬂows have to verify the following equilibrium conditions ∀n ∈{ l,h}:
(cT,n sT,n α(θT,n)+λn) Tn = γn (Un + Xn), (1)
(cn sX,n α(θn)+γn) Xn =( π0 − π1 sU,n) Un, (2)
(cn sU,n α(θn)+π0 − π1 sU,n + γn) Un = λn Tn + φn (En + ET,n), (3)
φn En = cn (sU,n Un + sX,n Xn) α(θn), (4)
φn ET,n = cT,n sT,n α(θT,n) Tn, (5)
11These parameters could be skill-speciﬁc. As it is rarely so in observed unemployment legislation, π0
and π1 will not be indexed by n. I return to that issue in Section 3.
6one of these equalities being redundant.
Let lower case letters en,u n,x n,t n,v n and vT,n be the rates obtained by dividing the
absolute numbers by the corresponding size of the labor force Ln (e.g. en ≡ En
Ln, vn ≡ Vn
Ln).
Equations (1), (2), (4), (5) and the identity 1 ≡ en + eT,n + un + xn + tn determine
en,e T,n,u n,x n and tn as a function of the endogenous variables sU,n,s X,n,s T,n,θ n and θT,n
and of the parameters ˜ Z =( cn,c T,n,φ n,γ n,λ n,π 0,π 1). In general, available statistics do
not make the distinction between en and eT,n. So, let us consider the sum en+eT,n, called
‘the employment rate’ (among active people endowed with skill n). If
∆0,n ≡ [cT,nsT,nα(θT,n)+λn]([cnsU,nα(θn)+φn][cnsX,nα(θn)+γn]
+ πn [cnsX,nα(θn)+φn]) + γn [ cT,nsT,nα(θT,n)+φn ][πn + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn],
(6)
then:
en + eT,n = E(θn,θ T,n,s T,n,s U,n,s X,n | ˜ Zn) ≡
 
[cT,nsT,nα(θT,n)+λn](cnsU,nα(θn) (7)




Similar expressions can be deﬁned for un,x n and tn.
2.2 Preferences and intertemporal utilities
All workers of type n have by assumption identical preferences. They are assumed to be
risk averse and to have no access to capital markets. Equilibrium search model with risk
averse workers are notoriously diﬃcult to handle. So, a simple separable instantaneous
utility function is adopted, namely ln(C) − ψn
sξn
ξn , with C denoting consumption and s
eﬀort while ψn and ξn > 1 are positive parameters. Appendix 4 summarizes the major
changes when an isoelastic function of consumption is used instead of ln(C). Eﬀort in
employment is ﬁxed and normalized to zero.12
Let W denote the net wage. The wage of a worker endowed with skill n is written
W = wT,n if (s)he holds a job after a training spell and W = wn otherwise. Let bι,n be
the level of beneﬁt received (ι = U,X,T). As such, levels of unemployment beneﬁts are
not a function of the skill. However, when they are (to some extent) indexed on wages, a
dependency with n appears via the wage. The following very plausible ranking is assumed:
Wn >b T,n >b U,n >b X,n > 0.
Let r be the discount rate assumed to be common to the workers and the ﬁrms. Holding
a job yields an intertemporal utility VE,n (respectively VE,n|T after a training programme)
deﬁned by
rVE,n = ln(wn)+φn(VU,n − VE,n), (8)
rVE,n|T = ln(wT,n)+φn(VU,n − VE,n|T). (9)
12It could equally well be normalized to any other value without changing the results.
7The level of search of jobless individual i is optimized at any point in time. So,
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X,n α(θn)(VE,n − V i
X,n)
+ γn(V i
T,n − V i
X,n). (12)
Only symmetric equilibria are considered, where all insured unemployed and trainees
have the same level of search eﬀort. Henceforth, superscript i will be dropped.
The ﬂows in Figure 1 require that jobless people have an incentive to accept job oﬀers.
Furthermore, even if active programs have more and more become compulsory, imposing
that workers have an incentive to enter training schemes sounds plausible. Finally, unem-
ployed people in state Xn have lower unemployment beneﬁts. This will intuitively boost
their search eﬀort, leading to a lower level of instantaneous utility but also to an improved
probability of exiting out of unemployment. So, the relationship between VU,n and VX,n
could be ambiguous. The following proposition establishes the ranking of intertemporal
utilities. Some of its assumptions introduce a hierarchy between endogenous variables that
will have to be checked later.
Proposition 1. ∀n,i fwT,n ≥ wn >b T,n >b U,n >b X,n > 0, θT,n ≥ θn, π0−π1sU,n ≥ 0,
cT,n ≥ cn and φn <λ n, then VE,n >V U,n >V X,n and VE,n|T >V T,n >V U,n.
Proof. From Equations (8) to (12), VE,n − VU,n can be written as:
VE,n − VU,n =
 
(r + cT,nsT,nα(θT,n)+λn)[(r + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn)(vE,n − vU,n)




where vE,n ≡ ln(wn), vU,n ≡ ln(bU,n) − ψn
(sU,n)ξn





ξn , and ∆1,n ≡ (r + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn)
 





[r + cT,nsT,nα(θT,n)+λn][r +
cnsX,nα(θn)+φn]+γn[r + cT,nsT,nα(θT,n)+φn]
 
. The hypotheses wn >b T,n >b U,n >
bX,n > 0 are suﬃcient to guarantee that VE,n − VU,n > 0.
VU,n − VX,n can be written as:
VU,n − VX,n =[ δUX,n+ cn(sU,n − sX,n)α(θn)(VE,n − VU,n)]/∆2,n, (14)
where δUX,n ≡ vU,n −vX,n and ∆2,n ≡ r +πn +cnsX,nα(θn)+γn. Appendix 1 shows that
VU,n >V X,n.
The proof that VT,n >V U,n is left to Appendix 1, too. If wT,n = wn, VT,n − VU,n can be
expressed in the following way:
VT,n − VU,n =
 
(r + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn)(δTU,n+( cT,nsT,nα(θT,n) − cnsU,nα(θn))(VE,n − VU,n))




where δTU,n ≡ vT,n − vU,n, δTX,n ≡ vT,n − vX,n and ∆3,n ≡ r + cT,nsT,nα(θT,n)+λn + γn.
VE,n|T − VT,n can be expressed as:
VE,n|T − VT,n =[ δET,n +( λn − φn)(VT,n − VU,n)]/∆4,n, (16)
where δET,n ≡ ln(wT,n) − vT,n and ∆4,n ≡ r + cT,nsT,nα(θT,n)+φn. Imposing λn >φ n is
suﬃcient to guarantee that VE,n|T >V T,n holds true.
2.3 The optimal level of search
The optimal level of search eﬀort sU,n,s X,n and sT,n are respectively solution to the fol-
lowing (suﬃcient) ﬁrst-order conditions:
ψn (sU,n)ξn−1 = cn α(θn)(VE,n − VU,n) − π1(VX,n − VU,n), (17)
ψn (sX,n)ξn−1 = cn α(θn)(VE,n − VX,n), (18)
ψn (sT,n)ξn−1 = cT,nα(θT,n)(VE,n|T − VT,n). (19)
In a partial equilibrium perspective (i.e. when θn and the V ’s are given), from Proposi-
tion 1 and Equality (17), increasing π1 raises sU,n, while π0 has no eﬀect. In the same
perspective, a higher hiring rate (through an increase in the c’s or in the α’s) stimulates
search eﬀort.
From (17) and (18),
sX,n  sU,n ⇔ (cn α(θn) − π1)(VU,n − VX,n)  0. (20)
9From Proposition 1, we know that VU,n − VX,n > 0. Condition cnα(θn) − π1 ≥ 0s a y s
that the marginal eﬀect of search eﬀort on the exit rate out of unemployment should be
at least as high as its marginal eﬀect, π1, on the rate πn at which beneﬁts decline. This
condition is obviously fulﬁlled if π1 = 0 and should still hold for moderate values of π1.
The exact meaning of the latter condition is clearly dependent of the skill-speciﬁc matching
eﬀectiveness (cn). Even, for populations with high matching eﬀectiveness, suﬃciently high
values of π1 should imply that sX,n becomes lower than sU,n for it will later be shown that
the equilibrium value of tightness decreases with π1 (see Proposition 5). To sum up, for
each skill n, one can expect that sX,n is higher or equal to sU,n as long as π1 is suﬃciently
small. This can be called the ‘ex-post eﬀect’ of declining beneﬁts.
Combining (18) and (19), sT,n  sU,n if and only if
cT,nα(θT,n)(VE,n|T − VE,n)+( cT,nα(θT,n) − cn α(θn))(VE,n − VU,n)
 cT,nα(θT,n)(VT,n − VU,n)+π1(VU,n − VX,n)
(21)
Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, the left-hand side is clearly positive. Whatever
the value of π1, the right-hand side is positive too. If π1 and the diﬀerence between VT,n
and VU,n are suﬃciently close to zero, one can expect that sT,n be higher than sU,n.
2.4 The employment rates
This subsection looks at the marginal eﬀects of θn,θ T,n,s U,n,s X,n,s T,n,φ n,γ n,λ n,π 0 and
π1 on the ‘employment rate’ en + eT,n.13
Proposition 2. For each skill n,
1. The employment rate en+eT,n increases with θn,θ T,n,s U,n,s X,n,s T,n and the param-











if sX,n ≥ sU,n
if sX,n <s U,n
3.
∂en+eT,n







if cT,nsT,nα(θT,n) ≥ cnsU,nα(θn) and cT,nsT,nα(θT,n) ≥ cXsXα(θ)
if cT,nsT,nα(θT,n) <c nsU,nα(θn) and cT,nsT,nα(θT,n) <c XsXα(θ)
Proof. See Appendix 2.
13The marginal eﬀects on the participation rate should be added if these rates were deﬁned with respect
to the population of working age instead of the active population.
10Corollary 1. If πn =0 , cT,nsT,nα(θT,n) >c nsU,nα(θn) is a suﬃcient condition for
∂en+eT,n
∂γn to be positive.
Proof. From Appendix 2, this result is immediate.
The eﬀect of the rate of entry into training programs (γn) strongly depends on the
relative values of the hiring rates. If the exit rate of the trainees is the highest among the
three groups of job seekers, the eﬀect of an increase in γn can still be ambiguous for each
additional unemployed who ﬂows from state Un into training would instead have increased
his (her) search eﬀort at the moment of entry in state Xn (if πn > 0 and provided that
the ‘ex-post eﬀect’ is observed). The corollary implies that the conditions needed to get
a positive eﬀect of γn on the employment rate are less numerous when unemployment
beneﬁts are constant. One cannot say more since the level of the endogenous variables
present in the above conditions vary whether unemployment beneﬁts are constant or not.
2.5 Jobcreation
For simplicity, taxation (including social security contributions) is linear. Let τ0,n+τ1,nwn
be the amount of taxes paid if the net wage is wn (τ1,n ≥ 0). Taxation is typically not skill-
speciﬁc. This is however a convenient way of capturing the idea that marginal and average
taxation can vary with the level of earnings. The ﬁrm’s discounted expected return from
an occupied job is denoted ΠE,n if this ﬁrms operates in the skill segment n (respectively,
ΠE,n|T if a former trainee is occupied). The discounted expected return of vacant job is
ΠV,n (respectively, ΠV,n|T). The diﬀerence between hiring a trainee and hiring another job-
seeker comes from the training cost. Since, conditional on their skill, workers are equally
productive, let yn be the constant marginal product of a ﬁlled vacancy. Remember that
Kn captures the cost involved in posting a vacancy in segment n, searching for applicants
and selecting them. Consider that Kn is proportional to yn : Kn ≡ kn yn. Similarly,
let us assume that the ﬁxed hiring costs are proportional to yn : Hn ≡ κn yn,H T,n ≡
κT,nyn (κn >κ T,n). For each skill n, the discounted expected returns satisfy the following
conditions:


















rΠV,n = −kn yn + q(θn)(Π E,n − κn yn − ΠV,n), (24)
rΠV,n|T = −kn yn + q(θT,n)
 
ΠE,n|T − κT,nyn − ΠV,n|T
 
. (25)
In equilibrium, vacancies are opened as long as they yield a positive expected return.
Therefore, in each segment n, the equilibrium conditions for the supply of vacancies are
ΠV,n|T =Π V,n = 0. These properties combined with (22), (23), (24), and (25) yield two
















yn − τ0,n − wT,n(1 + τ1,n)
r + φn
. (27)
It is easily checked that the ‘vacancy-supply curves’ establish a decreasing relationship
between the net wage and the corresponding indicator of tightness. In particular, Equation
(26) can be rewritten as:
wn = VS(θn | κn,k n,y n,r,φ n,τ 0,n,τ 1,n) ≡
yn
 









∂θn < 0, ∂VS
∂φn < 0, ∂VS
∂r < 0, ∂VS
∂kn < 0, ∂VS
∂κn < 0, ∂VS
∂τ0,n < 0, ∂VS
∂τ1,n < 0 and ∂VS
∂yn > 0.
2.6 The wage bargain
It is assumed that wages are collectively bargained over in each segment (ﬁrm) n by
insiders whose inter-temporal utility is VU,n in case of layoﬀ.14 Training expenditures are
then sunk costs. In order to show that a single wage will appear in each ﬁrm, let us
imagine that the insiders of type n bargain over two wages wn and wn,T. For each n, the

















  1−βn , (30)
with 0 <β n < 1. The assumption of a single representative ﬁrm has been made for the
sake of simplicity. It does not imply that the wage bargain is centralized in such a way
that insiders and the representative ﬁrm take care of the equilibrium eﬀect of wages on























14The existence of a minimum wage will be taken into account in the numerical analysis below.
122.7 Wages and tightness in a symmetric equilibrium
Taking (8), (9), (22) and (23) into account, the ﬁrst-order conditions (31) and (32) can be



















Therefore, wn = wT,n. These equations have an intuitive interpretation. If βn was equal
to zero, the instantaneous utility in employment would be equal to the minimum compen-
sation that an unemployed worker requires to stop searching. As βn increases, a growing
share of the relative diﬀerence yn − τ0,n − wn(1 + τ1,n) (scaled by wn(1 + τ1,n)) accrues
to the worker. The fact that wn = wT,n in each segment n has two implications. First,
VE,n|T = VE,n. Second, from (26) and (27), one has:









Therefore, θT,n >θ n. This equality deﬁnes a relationship θT,n = T (θn | κT,n,κ n,k n) with
∂T
∂θn > 0, ∂T
∂κT,n < 0, ∂T
∂κn > 0 and ∂T
∂kn < 0. So, θT,n and θn move together.
The next step consists in replacing rVU,n in (33) by a function of θn,θ T,n,s U,n,s X,n,s T,n
and the parameters of the model. From (10), rVU,n is a function of VE,n−VU,n, VU,n−VX,n
and VT,n− VU,n. Substituting expressions (14) and (15) in (10) allows to write rVU,n as a
function of VE,n − VU,n. This expression can then be substituted in (33). This yields the
following relationship:
ln(wn)=
[r + cT,nsT,nα(θT,n)+λn][r + γn + cnsX,nα(θn)]
∆2,n∆3,n




[vT,n + cT,nsT,nα(θT,n)(VE,n − VU,n)] +
πn[r + cT,nsT,nα(θT,n)+λn]
∆2,n∆3,n










where ∆2,n and ∆3,n have been respectively deﬁned after equations (14) and (15). Equa-
tion (31) combined with the free-entry conditions and with (22) and (26) implies that
















∂θn > 0, ∂V
∂βn > 0, ∂V
∂kn > 0, ∂V
∂κn > 0, ∂V








∂τ0,n > 0. Henceforth, V(·) will designate V(θn | βn,k n,κ n,r,φ n,y n,τ 0,n).
Let Zn =(˜ Zn,,κ n,κ T,n,k n,y n,r,β n)=( cn,c Tn,φ n,γ n,λ n,π 0,π 1,κ n,κ T,n,k n,y n,r,β n)
and Bn =( bT,n,b U,n,b X,n). Substituting (37) into (36) and using (26) yield an explicit
(net) ‘wage-setting curve’:
ln(wn)=WS(θn,θ T,n,s T,n,s U,n,s X,n | Zn,τ 0,n,B n) ≡























Proposition 3. For each skill n, the ‘wage-setting curve’ WS(θn,θ T,n,s T,n,s U,n,s X,n |
Zn,τ 0,n,B n) is upward-sloping in a (wn,θ n) space. It is not aﬀected by marginal
changes in search eﬀorts. For any θn, the wage increases with θT,n, the allowances
(bT,n,b U,n,b X,n),γ n,π 1,k n,κ n,β n,τ 0,n and φn. It decreases with π0 and λn and does not
vary with κT,n. Finally, still conditioning on θn, the sign of the marginal eﬀect of yn on
the net wage is the opposite of the sign of τ0,n.
Proof. The proof is left to Appendix 3.
The wage-push eﬀect of active labor market policies was a major point made by Holm-
lund and Lind´ en (1993). The opposite eﬀects of π0 and π1 on the wage-setting curve are
worth to be mentioned.
From (35), θT,n = T (θn | κT,n,κ n,k n) can be substituted in (38) to yield another wage
setting equation, namely:
WS(θn,s T,n,s U,n,s X,n | Zn,τ 0,n,B n) ≡ WS(θn,T (θn | κT,n,κ n,k n),s T,n,s U,n,s X,n | Zn,τ 0,n,B n)
(39)
Proposition 4. The partial derivatives of WS(θn,s T,n,s U,n,s X,n | Zn,τ 0,n,B n) have




Proof. This is obvious from the properties of function T (.).
The downward-sloping ‘vacancy-supply’ curve (28) and the upward-sloping wage-setting
equation ln(wn)=WS(θn,s T,n,s U,n,s X,n | Zn,τ 0,n,B n) deﬁne the equilibrium value of wn
14and θn. Taking the ln of (28) yields an implicit equation for θn, namely F(θn,s T,n,s U,n,s X,n |
Zn,τ 0,n,τ 1,n,B n) = 0 with :
F(θn,s T,n,s U,n,s X,n | Zn,τ 0,n,τ 1,n,B n) ≡ ln(VS(θn | κn,k n,y n,r,φ n,τ 0,n,τ 1,n))
−WS(θn,s T,n,s U,n,s X,n | Zn,τ 0,n,B n)
(40)
Marginal changes in search eﬀort do not aﬀect function F. For those parameters in Zn
that do not aﬀect the vacancy-supply curve, any variation that has a wage-push eﬀect
leads to a higher equilibrium net wage and lower tightness θn and conversely. Combining
the properties of (28) and of WS(θn,s T,n,s U,n,s X,n | Zn,τ 0,n,B n) leads directly to the
following proposition:
Proposition 5 For each skill n, the equilibrium net wage wn (respectively, the level
of tightness θn) increases (respectively, decreases) with bT,n,b U,n,b X,n,γ n,π 1,τ 0,n and βn.
The equilibrium net wage wn (respectively, the level of tightness θn) decreases (respectively,
increases) with π0,λ n and κT,n. The marginal tax rate τ1,n has a negative eﬀect on the
equilibrium wage and on tightness. φn and κn have a negative inﬂuence on θn but their
eﬀect on wn cannot be signed. The impact of kn is ambiguous on both θn and wn.I f
τ0,n =0 , the marginal product yn aﬀects the equilibrium wage and tightness positively. If
τ0,n < 0 (respectively, > 0), the eﬀect of yn on tightness (respectively, the wage) becomes
ambiguous.
So, in addition to its unclear eﬀect on the employment rate (Proposition 2), an increase
in the rate of entry into training will negatively aﬀect tightness in equilibrium and hence
the employment rate. On the contrary, the favorable eﬀect of π0 on the employment rate
(if sX,n >s U,n; see Proposition 2) is here reinforced by a positive eﬀect on the equilibrium
level of tightness. The opposite holds for π1. Therefore, the rationale for making πn vary
with search eﬀort sU,n heavily depends on the eﬀect of π1 on search eﬀort in equilibrium.
Before looking at this issue, it is useful to come back to the major result in Cahuc and
Lehmann (2000). This result can be restated and generalized15 as follows. Keep the tax
parameters ﬁxed and imagine that a marginal decrease in the lower level of beneﬁts (bX,n)
is compensated by a marginal increase in the highest level of beneﬁts (dbU,n = −dbX,n >
0). This is called “front-loading” the beneﬁt system. A steeper proﬁle will only aﬀect
the wage-setting curve through its eﬀect on the inter-temporal utility of those entering
unemployment, VU,n. Since only marginal changes are considered here, the adjustment of
search eﬀort levels can be neglected as long as one only looks at the impact on wages and
tightness. Therefore, diﬀerentiating (38) with respect to bU,n and bX,n, it can be checked
that the direction of change of the net wage wn is given by the sign of the following
15The following result is more general for three reasons: Search eﬀort is here endogenous, active programs
are taken into account and the rate at which unemployed people enter the low-beneﬁt state is a parameter
(or a function of sU,n if π1 = 0).
15expression:






The equilibrium value of tightness varies in the opposite direction. The higher the rate
πn, the lower the intertemporal utility in the state of entry after a job loss. So, if πn
is high, front-loading has more chance of leading to wage moderation. The levels of the
discount rate r and of the exit rate out of state Xn (cX,nsX,nα(θn)+γn) have the opposite
eﬀect. If the ﬁrst ratio in (41) is higher than one, then in the neighborhood of a situation
where bU,n = bX,n, the equilibrium value of tightness will decrease (wages will increase).
Front-loading the beneﬁt system is then expected to raise tightness only when the ratio
bU,n/bX,n is already suﬃciently high. Consequently, a short expected period in the high
beneﬁt state and a low rate of entry into training schemes should be recommended if one
intends to raise the number of vacancies per (eﬃcient) job-seeker through a steeper proﬁle
of unemployment beneﬁts. Of course, front-loading the beneﬁt system will also aﬀect
search eﬀort. It is therefore time to look at the equilibrium levels of search.
2.8 The equilibrium levels of search
In a symmetric equilibrium, expressions (13), (14), (15) and (16) could be substituted in
the optimality conditions (17), (18) and (19). However, this leads to very few clear-cut
properties. Alternatively, the bargain over the rent created by each match combined with
the free-entry condition for vacancies leads to (37). This expression can be substituted for
VE − VU in the ﬁrst-order conditions (17), (18) and (19) in which VU − VX has ﬁrst been
replaced by (14) and VT − VU by (15). After some manipulation, this leads for each n to:
ΣU(θn,s U,n,s X,n,s T,n | Zn,τ 0,n,B n) = 0 (42)
with ΣU ≡ ∆2,n ψn s
ξn−1
U,n − π1δUX,n− cn (∆2,n + π1[sU,n − sX,n])α(θn)V(·)
ΣX(θn,s U,n,s X,n,s T,n | Zn,τ 0,n,B n) = 0 (43)
with ΣX ≡ ∆2,n ψn s
ξn−1
X,n − cn α(θn)[δUX,n +( ∆ 2,n + cn [sU,n − sX,n]α(θn)) V(·)]
ΣT(θn,θ T,n,s U,n,s X,n,s T,n | Zn,τ 0,n,B n) = 0 (44)




∆2,n ∆3,n − [r + cn sX,nα(θn)+γn]
[cT,nsT,nα(θT,n) − cn sU,n α(θn)] − πn[cT,nsT,nα(θT,n) − cn sX,nα(θn)]
 
V(·)
− (r + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn) δTU,n − πn δTX,n
 
.
This approach allows to derive a set of clear analytical properties. Their interpretation
requires however a lot of care. For, exploiting (37) implies that wages are endogenous but
16also that the behavior of ﬁrms is optimized. However, in (42), (43) and (44), the ratios θ
and θT are taken as free variables. An interpretation of the following comparative statics
would be that the number of vacancies is optimally chosen by the employers but S and ST
are adjusted to keep θn and θT,n unchanged. Obviously, the following properties should
be considered as intermediate ones. In a next step, one needs to take the adjustment of θn
and θT,n into account (according to (40) and θT,n = T (θn | κT,n,κ n,k n)). The ambiguity
reached then for many parameters (see Table 1) cannot easily be understood without the
following intermediate result, however.
Totally diﬀerentiating equations (42), (43) and (44), it can be checked that ∂Σι
∂sι  =
0 ∀ι,ι  ∈{ { T,n},{X,n},{U,n}},ι  = ι ,n ∈{ l,h}. Furthermore, if π1 =0 ,sU,n in-
creases with θn. Otherwise, this relationship is ambiguous. Search eﬀort sU,n increases
with π1,β n,k n,κ n, and φn.I f π1 > 0, sU,n increases with bU,n and it decreases with
γn,b X,n and π0. Otherwise, sU,n is independent of bU,n, bX,n,π 0 and γn. The sepa-
rability of the instantaneous utility function and the fact that VE,n − VU,n is replaced
by V(θn,β n,k n,κ n,r,φ n,y n,τ 0,n) in (42) explain why the unemployment beneﬁt bU,n can
only inﬂuence sU through the sanction rate π1. Then, a higher bU,n raises the diﬀerence
VU,n − VX,n and therefore pushes sU,n upwards in order to reduce the risk of a reduction
in unemployment beneﬁts.
sX,n and sT,n increase with bU,n and π1 and they decrease with π0 (the so-called ‘enti-
tlement eﬀect’ due to Mortensen, 1977). By an ‘entitlement eﬀect’, one here means that
the prospect of higher or longer beneﬁts in the ﬁrst unemployment stage (Un) stimulates
search eﬀort in the other states because entering a job is now more interesting taking the
risk of a future layoﬀ into account.
The eﬀects of other parameters (conditional on θn and θT,n) are also summarized in
Table 1. As an example, raising the workers’ bargaining power augments the share of the
surplus they receive. Hence, search eﬀort is stimulated by an increase in βn (still keeping
θn and θT,n ﬁxed).
Table 1 also presents the comparative static properties when the adjustment of θn and
θT,n is taken into account. The impact of the parameters on the equilibrium value of search
in the ﬁrst state (column ‘s∗
U,n’ in Table 1) is only given when π1 = 0 (otherwise, net eﬀects
become ambiguous). For the other states, the corresponding columns are s∗
X,n and s∗
T,n.
If π1 = 0, because of the adjustment of tightness levels, s∗
U,n is declining with the level of
each of the three beneﬁts and it is increasing with π0. The latter eﬀect can be called an
‘ex-ante eﬀect’ of declining beneﬁts. Interestingly, π1 has an ambiguous eﬀect on search
eﬀort s∗
U,n: Conditional on tightness, as π1 starts increasing search eﬀort reacts positively
but at the same time tightness is aﬀected negatively (Proposition 5). As far as s∗
X,n and
s∗
T,n are concerned, one cannot determine whether the ‘entitlement eﬀect’ is more than
oﬀset by the impacts of bU,n,π 0,π 1 on equilibrium tightness. Moreover, Table 1 indicates
that in addition to its wage-push eﬀect (Proposition 5), γn also reduces the equilibrium
level of job-search eﬀort in states Un and Xn. The tax parameters aﬀect equilibrium
search eﬀorts via their impacts on tightness. Finally, taking the negative inﬂuence of βn
17on tightness levels, the eﬀect of the workers’ bargaining power on the equilibrium levels of
search eﬀort is ambiguous.
2.9 Uniqueness of equilibrium conditional on a vector (Zn,τ 0,n,τ 1,n,B n)
Proposition 6 Conditional on (Zn,τ 0,n,τ 1,n,B n), the equilibrium, if any, is unique if
π1 =0 .
Proof. From the properties of functions VSand WS, the solution θn to Equation (40),
if any, is unique. Hence, along VS, wn is uniquely determined, too. From (35), the same
is then true for θT,n. The properties of the functions Σ imply that search eﬀort levels are
increasing functions of tightness if π1 = 0. So, for the equilibrium value of tightness, if
there exists a solution to equations (42), (43) and (44), it is unique, too. From Equations
(1) to (5), explicit expressions can then be derived for the rates (en +eT,n,u n,x n,t n) (see
e.g. Equation (7)). By an argument of continuity, the same property should obviously
hold for suﬃciently low values of π1.
2.10 Summary of the analytical properties
Focusing on the eﬀect of passive and active labor market policies on the employment rate,
the analytical properties can be summarized as follows. With respect to the rate of entry
into programs (γn), one knows that θT,n >θ n, ∀n, in equilibrium. This and the plausible
assumption that cT,n ≥ cn lead to the expectation that the hiring rate of trainees will
be greater than the hiring rates of those in states Un and Xn. From Proposition 2, it
is then plausible (but not sure) that γn has a positive direct eﬀect on the employment
rate. The marginal eﬀect of γn is however negative on tightness and on search eﬀort levels
in states Un and Xn. Even if one ignores the ﬁnancing of training schemes, their net
eﬀect on employment appears to be gloomy. The rate at which the high beneﬁt stage
ends is typically independent of the behavior of the unemployed. In that case (i.e. if
π1 = 0), increasing π0 has a direct positive eﬀect on the employment rate. Moreover, it
induces higher tightness and more search eﬀort among the unemployed beneﬁting from
bU,n. However, via a negative entitlement eﬀect, increasing π0 reduces the incentive the
other types of job seekers have. So, the net eﬀect of an increase in π0 cannot be signed
analytically. If π1 becomes positive but suﬃciently small,16 increasing this rate would have
two negative marginal eﬀects, a direct one on the employment rate and an indirect one
on tightness. Nevertheless, conditional on tightness, increasing π1 gives an incentive to
search more. In spite of the previous negative eﬀects, using π1 as an additional instrument
could turn out to be interesting if the last eﬀect is strong enough. Finally, it is interesting
to emphasize a last analytical property, namely that a short expected period in the high
16So that sX,n remains higher than sU,n and the relationship between search eﬀort sU,n and θn remains
positive.
18beneﬁt state and a low rate of entry into training schemes should be recommended if
one intends to raise the number of vacancies per (eﬃcient) job-seeker through a two-
tired beneﬁt system. Otherwise, increasing the diﬀerence between bU,n and bX,n could be
detrimental to employment.
2.11 Extending the model
Up to now, the budget constraint of the State (including the Social Security system) has




bU,nUn + bX,nXn +( bT,n + C)Tn =
 
n∈{h,l}
(τ0,n + τ1,n wn)(En + ET,n), (45)
where Q is an exogenous level of net expenses and C is the average cost of training
programs.17 Constraint (45) establishes the unique direct link between the two labor
markets. To meet this constraint, one could either adjust the level of allowances (Bn)o r
the one of taxes. Adjusting taxes is the most standard approach. However, Rocheteau
(1999) has shown that endogeneizing taxes in order to balance the budget of the State can
lead to multiple equilibria. One should therefore care about this possibility. Appendix 5
shows that the uniqueness of equilibrium can be preserved if τ0,n = π1 = 0, the replacement
ratios are constant and τ1,n is adjusted to clear the budget of the State.
The size of the labor force, Ln, matters when the budget of the State is introduced.
Participation is modeled in a very simple way (see Pissarides, 2000). Inactive people have
an arbitrage condition: Staying inactive or entering state Xn.18 The lower the expected
intertemporal utility in state Xn, VX,n, the lower the participation rate pn ≡ Ln/Pn.
Let [V1,n,V 2,n] be the ﬁnite support of the distribution of intertemporal utility levels in






Entering into the debate about welfarist versus non-welfarist criteria would take us too far
aﬁeld. As is standard in economics, let us assume that utility functions are an appropriate
basis for a normative analysis. If the utility functions of the low-skilled and the skilled
population are identical, adding the utility functions of the various individuals is justiﬁed.
Utility levels will be represented by their certainty equivalents. This approach consists in
17C is here taken as ﬁxed and increasing π1 does not add monitoring cost. These hypotheses could be
relaxed.
18Alternatively, they could enter uninsured unemployment (i.e. start an unemployment spell without any
beneﬁt). However, in many OECD countries, people who are ready to take a job and have no income are
eligible to a minimum income guarantee. The latter is typically related to the lowest level of unemployment
beneﬁts. So, the simplifying assumption made here is not a substantial limitation.
19computing the level of income that would yield the intertemporal utility, say V , if this
income was received forever. Hence, with the assumed utility function, exp[rV] will denote
the certainty equivalent of V .





L , can be deﬁned for the active population, with L ≡
 
n Ln and:
rΨn ≡ (exp[rVE,n](en + eT,n) + exp[rVU,n]un + exp[rVX,n]xn + exp[rVT,n]tn). (47)
3 A numerical analysis
3.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated for Belgium with the month as unit of time. The discount rate is
ﬁxed to 0.004 (5% on an annual basis). As far as possible, the values of the parameters
are based on observed data for the nineties. The period 1997-1998 has been used as a
reference.19 Belgium is a country plagued with long-term unemployment (LTU for short).
For a very long time, more than 60% of the stock of unemployed is unoccupied for more
than a year. Among these long-term unemployed, about 70% are jobless for more than two
years. The median elapsed duration in the stock of 1997 was about 2 years. In Belgium,
negative duration dependence is very strong but Dejemeppe and Cockx (2000) and Deje-
meppe and Saks (2002) have shown that it is largely spurious. Furthermore, in Belgium,
the relative unemployment rate of the low-skilled workers compared to the skilled ones is
very large and increasing (see the previous references). Due to statistical availabilities,
let us assume that holding at most a lower-secondary degree captures relatively well the
notion of ‘low skill’. Low-skilled workers then represent about 34% of the labor force.
According to administrative data, the rate20 of insured unemployment was equal to 0.105
in 1997. Within the group of skilled workers, the rate of short-term unemployment (STU
for short) was equal to 0.031 and the rate of LTU amounted to 0.027. For the low-skilled,
the same rates were respectively equal to 0.062 and 0.139. Adding these two rates for each
skill group gives the skill-speciﬁc unemployment rate. With 64% of the unemployed being
low skilled, one clearly sees that as in many other OECD countries the unemployment
problem of the low-skilled is very acute.
Turning to the Belgian institutional setting, the level and the time-proﬁle of unemploy-
ment beneﬁts vary with the family composition. There is ﬁrst a period of one year where
unemployment beneﬁts stay constant. For about two thirds of the insured unemployed,
the level of beneﬁts decreases afterwards. Unemployed people in charge of a family or
living alone can receive insurance beneﬁts for an indeﬁnite length. Less than half of the
unemployed (mostly women) can lose their entitlement after a period which diﬀers a lot
19The years close to 1993 were deeply aﬀected by the major recession of the nineties. The last years of
this decade were clearly a boom. During the period 1997-1998 the unemployment rate was fairly stable.
20Following the theoretical model, rates are obtained by dividing the stocks by the (skill-speciﬁc) size of
the active population.
20according to various criteria (the minimum length is 24 months and the maximum one is
99 months). The end of entitlement and sanctions are here ignored because the rate at
which unemployed people move from the ‘high’ (bU,n) to the ‘low’ (bX,n) level of beneﬁts
is much more substantial. Within the stochastic framework presented in the previous sec-
tion, the expected duration of the period during which bU,n is collected is ﬁxed to a year.
For the calibration, π0 is therefore equal to 0.0833 and π1 = 0. The level of unemployment
beneﬁts is in principle proportional to the previous wage, with upper- and lower-bounds.
On the basis of administrative data about the level of beneﬁt paid out to the unemployed
(in EURO/month)21, it is assumed that bU,h = 838, bX,h = 608, bU,l = 671 and bX,l = 529.
On the basis of EUROSTAT statistics, the estimated average net wages are wh = 1650
and wl = 1308.22 Hence, the net replacement ratios are bU,h/wh =0 .51, bX,h/wh =0 .37,
bU,l/wl =0 .51 and bX,l/wl =0 .40. 23
Vocational training for the unemployed is organized at the regional level in Belgium. In
accordance with the model, programs that in a way or another put the unemployed back to
school are ignored. In 1998, according to EUROSTAT data, the average stock of jobless
people participating in training programs amounted to 0.67% of the active population
and the average cost of training programs per worker amounted to 669 EURO/month
(net of transfers to beneﬁciaries of these programs). Annual reports of the regional PES
allow to split the stock of participants into low-skilled and skilled individuals. This leads
to the skill-speciﬁc rates th =0 .006 and tl =0 .008. These reports also allow to ﬁx
λh = λl =0 .1,γ h =0 .02 and γl =0 .006. Belgian trainees receive a beneﬁt that is
marginally higher than the unemployment beneﬁt. It is assumed that bT,h = 864 and
bT,l = 697.
On the basis of administrative data and labour force surveys, the rate of salaried
employment, eh + eT,h (respectively, el + eT,l), was equal to 0.75 (resp., 0.61) in 1997.24
The participation rates ph (resp. pl) were equal to 0.72 (resp. 0.54). Administrative data
on inﬂows into unemployment allow to ﬁx φh to 0.006 and φl to 0.009.
On the basis of statistics collected by the Federal Planing Bureau and on the distribu-
tion of the tax burden, the tax wedge is huge: τ1,h =1 .23 and τ1,l =0 .67.25
The calibration uses information on the stock of vacancies. In 1997, the average stock
of vacancies registered by the PES amounted to 24569. The market share of the PES is not
well known. According to OECD (1997), it would be about 0.4. So, 60000 (respectively,
0.13) is an order of magnitude for the total stock of vacancies (resp. the aggregate V-U
21All nominal quantities are in 1997 Belgian Francs, converted in EUROs.
22Adding social security contributions incident on workers and the income tax, this average wage for
the low-skilled is above the average minimum gross wage (1074 EURO/month) and above the average
minimum wage bargained over at the sectoral level (1188 EURO/month). These wage ﬂoors are taken into
account during the simulations.
23These ratios are lower than reported values by the OECD on the basis of a range of earnings and family
situations (see e.g. Table A.1 of OECD, 1999). However, for Belgium, these OECD statistics exclude some
groups whose replacement ratio is quite low.
24The model is adapted to take the exogenous level of self-employment into account.
25The parameters τ0,n are kept equal to zero throughout.
21ratio). Various surveys26 and published statistics are also used to ﬁx the share of vacancies
of each type. It is assumed that half of the vacancies are open in the low-skill segment.
As many other papers, let us assume a Cobb-Douglas matching function with two









have found that µ =0 .5 is a good approximation (see e.g. Broersma and van Ours, 1999).
So, µ is ﬁxed to 0.5. Parameter m0 is a scaling factor for the various cι. A range of values
has been considered. It turns out that assuming that m0 =0 .5 yields reasonable values.
Since the model intends to represent the behavior of private ﬁrms, the calibration assumes
that the endogenous numbers of vacancies, Vn and VT,n, are multiplied by a coeﬃcient that
takes into account the existence of vacancies created by the public sector and by non-proﬁt
organizations. The latter are assumed to represent 18% of the total stock of vacancies.27
The number of vacancies posted by the public sector and the non-proﬁt organizations is
kept ﬁxed during the simulations.
The expected duration of a vacancy and the share of the low-skilled in the total number
of recruitments is used to calibrate θn,n ∈{ h,l}. Data on the former (2.5 month) and
on the latter (0.38) is based on Denys et al (1998, 1999) and Delmotte et al (2001). This
leads to θh =0 .83 and θl =2 .22.
The ‘vacancy-supply curves’ (26) are then used to calibrate kn. At this stage, as-
sumptions about yn and κn are needed. In the absence of observed statistics on these
parameters, the following procedure has been adopted. Starting from initial values, an
iteration procedure has been implemented until the complete calibration yields reasonable
values for the total number of vacancies and produces the observed share of vacancies
open for the low-skilled unemployed. The following values are ﬁnally adopted : yh = 5800
(again in EURO/month), yl = 3200, κh = 18 and κl = 7. Hence, the assumed ﬁxed cost
paid once and for all when a new employee is recruited amount to 18 months of output for
skilled workers and 7 months for low-skilled workers. Recall that this ﬁxed cost include
ﬁrm-speciﬁc training cost but also other match-speciﬁc setup costs. With these assump-
tions, the cost of opening vacancies can be calibrated. kh amounts to 9.26 and kl to 5.31.
This hierarchy is plausible since recruitment costs are presumably much larger for skilled
workers. However, the magnitude of these parameters looks large. Many authors have
also found quite large values of k.28 An interpretation is that in a model where investment
is not modeled kn (jointly with κn) implicitly captures these expenses and ﬁring taxes.29
An assumption about κT,n is needed in order to calibrate θT,n,n∈{ h,l}. No data are
available about κT,n. For various values of the ratio κT,n/κn, the ﬂow equilibrium condi-
tions (1), (2), (4) and (5) are used to ﬁx the products cιsι,ι= {T,n},{X,n},{U,n},n∈
26Simoens, Denys and Denolf (1998), Denolf, Denys and Simoens (1999) and Delmotte, Van Hootegem
and Dejonckheere (2001).
27This assumption is based on the survey made by Delmotte, Van Hootegem and Dejonckheere (2001).
28See Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) and the references cited in their footnote 20. See also Lehmann
and Van der Linden (2002).
29When they hire a worker, employers should take these ﬁring taxes into account. Formally, it is easily
checked that these taxes can be integrated in the parameters κn.




sX,n. Conditional on the values of the
product cιsι’s, the calibration then ﬁxes the cι’s, the sι’s, ξn, ψn and the bargaining
power of the workers βn. This part of the calibration is based on equations (38), (42),
(43), (44) and on additional equations stipulating a value for the elasticity of unem-
ployment duration with respect to the level of unemployment beneﬁts.30 As κT,n/κn
decreases, the ratio VT,n/Vn increases and the ratio cT,n/cn shrinks. It turns out that
cT,h/ch becomes rapidly lower than 1 as κT,n/κn decreases. Such an outcome being
not plausible, one adopts the lowest ratio κT,n/κn compatible with cT,h/ch ≥ 1. So,
κT,n/κn =0 .85,∀n. Hence, from (35), θT,h =1 .09 and θT,l =2 .49. So, the labor mar-
ket is more tight for trainees than for other job-seekers.The calibrated values are then
sU,h =0 .21,s X,h =0 .26,s T,h =0 .28,c h =0 .578,c T,h =0 .580,ξ h =1 .22,ψ h =1 5 .03,s U,l =
0.11,s X,l =0 .14,s T,l =0 .17,c l =0 .24,c T,l =0 .27,ξ l =1 .20,ψ l =1 5 .03,β h =0 .39 and
βl =0 .58. It turns out that skilled workers search more intensively. As expected, they
have higher matching eﬀectiveness parameters. Compared to the initial state (Un), search
eﬀort is higher when occupying state Xn but the diﬀerence is not very large. Moreover, ξh
is close to ξl, so that preferences are similar for both types of workers. The workers’ bar-
gaining power are such that βl >µ>β h.31 One could wonder why βl >β h. In Belgium,
unionization is a widespread phenomenon, especially among blue-collar workers. This can
explain why the bargaining power of low-skilled workers is higher. Combining the above
information, the expected duration of a training spell is indeed quite short (3.7 months for
the skilled and 5.8 months for the low-skilled workers). The (VT,n + Vn)/(Un + Xn + Tn)
ratios amount to 0.09 for the low-skilled and 0.15 for the skilled workers. The calibrated
values also imply that the wage elasticity of salaried employment amounts to reasonable
values, namely -0.72 for low-skilled workers and -0.25 for skilled ones.
Finally, as far as participation is concerned, the elasticity of pn with respect to wn
allows to ﬁx V2,n − V1,n. There is little consensus about this elasticity, especially for
the large groups considered in this paper (see Saez, 2002). This author suggests that an
elasticity equal or above 0.5 is plausible at the low end of the income distribution. On the
basis of historical observations for Belgium, assuming such a value for this country leads
to unrealistic adjustments in participation. A smaller value of 0.25 was assumed for both
groups. Then, V2,h − V1,h = 1215.5 and V2,l − V1,l = 1261.1. This information and the
30Since it is expressed for ﬁxed values of tightness, this elasticity can be chosen by looking at microe-
conometric evaluations. No such evaluation exists for Belgium. Therefore, one has to rely on evaluations
made abroad, mostly in countries were unemployment duration is much lower than in Belgium. So, only
the expected duration in state Un is considered here. Meyer (2002) is the most recent published survey
about the eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts on unemployment duration. An elasticity of 0.5 would be a
benchmark. However, no solution can be found to the system of equations when such a value is imposed.
A tˆ atonnement process leads to the conclusion that the highest elasticity allowing a solution to the system
of equations is 0.28 for the skilled workers. For the low-skilled, the constraint ψl = ψh has to be imposed
in order to ﬁnd a solution. Then, the elasticity of unemployment duration in state Ul with respect to bU,l
equals 0.16.
31Since workers are risk averse, the Hosios conditions βn = µ does not necessarily guarantee that a
laissez-faire economy is optimal. On this issue, see Lehmann and Van der Linden (2002).
23participation rates in 1997 allow to ﬁx the lower bound : V1,h = 879.6 and V1,l = 954.7.
3.2 Simulation results
3.2.1 Unemployment insurance
Three reforms will be envisaged in turn. They will respectively concern parameter π0, the
ratios
bU,n
bX,n and parameter π1.
Let ﬁrst π0 increase when the replacement ratios and the tax rates are kept at their cal-
ibrated values and π1 remains equal to 0. To ease comparisons with the existing literature,
let us ignore training schemes (γn =0 ,∀n ∈{ h,l}). Theory predicts that the wage-setting
curve shifts downwards, equilibrium tightness θn and search eﬀort sU,n increase and the
net wage rate wn decreases. Due to space limitation, Figure 2 illustrates these results
for n = l. These properties and the following ones hold however also for n = h. The
net eﬀect on search eﬀort of unemployed people in stage Xn is theoretically unknown for
the ‘entitlement eﬀect’ and the improvement in tightness have opposite eﬀects. Figure 2
illustrates that search eﬀort sX,l is actually declining a little. Up to values of π0 close
to the current one (0.083), search eﬀort sU,l and the employment rate of the low-skilled
(resp., the aggregate unemployment rate u + x) are sharply increasing (resp., decreasing)
with π0. The improvement of these indicators becomes however negligible above π0 =0 .1
(i.e. a ﬁrst period of relatively high beneﬁts that is expected to last 10 months). The par-
ticipation rate of the low-skilled is somewhat declining with π0. Interestingly, lower wages
and more search eﬀort in states Un have a larger impact on intertemporal utilities than
the higher hiring rates, so that the rV·n indicators are decreasing with π0 for all groups.
Therefore, the utilitarian criterion rΨ is decreasing, too. This ﬁrst set of results highlights
a phenomenon that often occurs in the simulations, namely that performance indicators
of the labor market and welfare criteria move in opposite directions. This questions the
widespread focus on labor market indicators to guide the design of institutional reforms.
For a range of values of the discount rate and in the case of a log utility function, sim-
ulations made by Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) lead to the conclusion that employed
workers and the (average) unemployed person would prefer a declining proﬁle of beneﬁts.
These authors assume that the budget constraint of the State has to be balanced through
an adjustment of the tax wedge. Under appropriate assumptions, Section 2.11 above has
shown that this approach is sound in the sense that it does not lead to multiple equilibria.
As π0 increases, employment is higher and public spending for the unemployed is lower.
So taxes can be cut, enhancing welfare. One can however wonder whether the conclusion
of Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) is veriﬁed when workers are heterogeneous. Two
values of the discount rate have been considered, namely r =0 .004 and r =0 .006.32 For
these values, the conclusion is that π0 = 0 is not desirable since the welfare of each type
32Since the calibration is conditional on a given value of r, the model has been calibrated again for
r =0 .006. Another exercise would consist in considering other values for the relative risk aversion of the
workers.
24of agent and labor market indicators are improving when π0 is raised from zero. More
interestingly, the optimal value of π0 strongly varies with the normative criterion used.
This property is clearer for r =0 .006. The utilitarian criterion is sharply increasing with
π0 for low values of this parameter and, as Figure 3 illustrates, it is a rather ﬂat function
around the optimum which is slightly above 0.2. On the contrary, from the viewpoint of
a low-skilled entering unemployment, Figure 4 indicates that π0 should be close to 0.03.
Therefore, if such an approach is feasible in reality, this normative analysis points to the
need of rates π0 that are skill-speciﬁc.
Keeping π0 at its calibrated value (0.083), let us now look at the optimal degree
of diﬀerentiation bU,n/bX,n. When simulating the eﬀects of “front-loading” the beneﬁt
system, the level of unemployment beneﬁts (not the replacement ratios) varies in the
following way. Let   be a positive parameter such that bU,n =
√
 bc




where superscript c denotes the calibrated values. Hence, bU,n/bX,n =  (bc
U,n/bc
X,n),∀n ∈
{h,l}. Increasing   means that both ratios bU,n/bX,n increase in the same proportion.




the discount rate is set at 0.004. Figure 5 displays how the level of beneﬁts vary with  
for the low-skilled. Since bU,n (bT,n) and bX,n move in opposite directions the net eﬀects
on wages and on tightness are theoretically ambiguous. Let us here ignore the budget
constraint of the State. By generalizing Expression (41), it can be checked that the sign
of dwn
d  is given by the following expression:
(r + cT,nsT,nα(θT,n)+λn)(r + γn + cnsX,nα(θn) − πn)+γn(r + πn + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn)
The sign of this expression critically depends on the value of the parameters. For the
calibrated values, it turns out that it is positive for skilled workers and negative for the
other group. So, the wage of the low-skilled decreases and the one of the skilled increases.
In this example, the wage-push eﬀect of “front-loading” (Cahuc and Lehmann, 2000) only
emerges for skilled workers.33 This eﬀect is however not strong. Tightness varies in the
opposite direction but again to a limited extent only. On the contrary, search eﬀort sX,l is
increasing a lot with   (see Figure 6). Since θh is only decreasing a little with   the same
qualitative conclusion holds for sX,h. The combination of all these eﬀects is a substantial
increase in the low-skill employment rate, el+eT,l (see Figure 7). Conversely, the net eﬀect
on skilled employment is negligible. The utilitarian criterion is slightly increasing with  .
However, the net eﬀect of lower wages, more search eﬀort and better chances of being
hired is a decline in the intertemporal utility of the low-skilled in all positions (see Figure
8 in the case of jobless individuals). The opposite holds for the skilled except when they
occupy state Xh. To sum up, “front loading” the beneﬁt system can boost employment
but, in this example at least, it also lowers welfare for the low-skilled.
Actual unemployment insurance systems do not establish a link between search eﬀort
and the length of time during which the highest level of beneﬁt is paid. However, a growing
33Unreported simulation results show that the same qualitative conclusions hold when γh = γl =0 .I n
accordance with the comment of Formula (41), wages are decreasing with   for suﬃciently high values of
πn.
25literature tries to evaluate the pros and cons of conditioning the level of beneﬁts on search
eﬀort. To ease comparisons, let again γh = γl = 0. Figure 9 summarizes a simulation
exercise where π1 increases while π0 and the replacement ratios remain unchanged. Here,
the tax rates τ1,n are adjusted to keep the budget of the State balanced. From Table 1,
one expects sU,h and sU,l to increase conditional on tightness. Proposition 5 states that
wages will be pushed up and tightness down. This is actually what occurs but the eﬀects
are not large. Hence, the net eﬀect on sU,l is positive. Therefore, for the largest value of
π1 (namely, 0.15), sU,l has nearly reached sX,l so that πl now equals 0.062 (an expected
duration of receipt of ‘high’ beneﬁts of 16 months instead of 12). For the same value of π1,
this expected duration is now 22 months for the skilled unemployed. The eﬀects on the
aggregate unemployment rate (u + x) and on its composition are rather small. The net
eﬀect on the intertemporal utility of the various groups is slightly positive but again quite
low. Due to a lack of data, recall that the additional monitoring costs are here neglected.34
So, this reform is apparently no big deal for the Belgian labor market.
3.2.2 Training programs
In the following simulations, the rates of entry γn are the same for both skill groups and
vary from 0 to 0.1. Let us ﬁrst keep all the other parameters at their calibrated values.
Focusing on the low-skilled, Figure 10 summarizes a simulation where taxation and the
level of unemployment beneﬁts are ﬁxed. Since bT,n is only slightly higher than bU,n, the
wage-push eﬀect of training programs mainly comes through better employment prospects
for trained individuals. Figure 10 highlights a moderate positive eﬀect on wl and a more
substantial negative impact on tightness θl. Since θT,l is not a function of γl (see function
T ), θT,l follows the decline in θl. Search eﬀort levels in states Ul and Xl are decreasing
with γl (directly and/or via tightness indicators; see Table 1). The total eﬀect on search
eﬀort is strong. The net eﬀect on the employment rates is negative, too. So, increasing the
share of jobless people with more favorable exit rates thanks to training is here insuﬃcient
to compensate the previous negative eﬀects. The aggregate unemployment rate u + x
is declining but ‘open unemployment’ (u + x + t) is strongly increasing. Nevertheless,
increasing γ improves the intertemporal utility levels of all groups in the active population
(Figure 10 only displays the average).
Corollary 1 suggests that the direct eﬀect of γn on en + eT,n depends on the level of
πn. To illustrate that point, let us keep the assumptions of the previous simulation except
that πn is now set equal to zero. As expected, the level of the endogenous variables is very
diﬀerent in Figures 11 and 10. More interestingly, the relationship between el+eT,l and γl
is now (slightly) positive. Since a beneﬁt system where π0 = 0 is more generous than the
one where π0 =0 .0833, this example illustrates the lack of generality of the assertion of
Coe and Snower (1997) according to which “the more generous are passive unemployment
34Moreover, as soon as subjective evaluations of search eﬀort enter the scene, a third party can be invoked
(courts) entailing non negligible costs. In addition, one should take the imperfections of the monitoring
system into account. So-called ‘errors of type I and II’ would lower welfare.
26policies, the less eﬀective will be active unemployment policies” (p. 22). However, this
sentence holds true as far as the level of beneﬁts is concerned. Unreported simulation
results for πn = 0 illustrate that the positive impact of γl on el + eT,l is more substantial
for lower values of (bU,n,b X,n,b T,n). The eﬀect of γl on el + eT,l becomes even negative
when the level of beneﬁts increases above a certain threshold.
Training schemes entail a cost in addition to the transfer to the beneﬁciaries. This
cost is now taken into account in a crude way (see (45)). To avoid multiple equilibria,
the replacement ratios are now constant. πn is also back to its calibrated value (0.0833).
Figure 12 shows the main features in that situation. The wage-push eﬀect of training
schemes is now more than compensated by the depressing eﬀect of higher tax rates τ1,n.
By the assumption of constant replacement ratios, the level of beneﬁts is declining, too.
These eﬀects would lead to the expectation that the proﬁle of tightness will be more
favorable compared to the case where taxes are ﬁxed (Figure 10). This expectation is
not veriﬁed for higher taxes are detrimental to the creation of vacancies. Eventually, the
net eﬀect on the employment rates is negative. In the inter-temporal utility functions,
the decrease in search eﬀort and the more probable entry in training schemes are more
than compensated by the depressed employment perspectives for the unemployed and the
lower levels of income. Hence, increasing γn harms each component of the workforce.
Consequently, the type of training schemes considered in this paper should be abandoned.
Are these pessimistic conclusions robust? As expected from above, the same exercise
with πn = 0 will lead to a diﬀerent picture for some indicators. Unreported simulation
results show that el + eT,l is now increasing with γn. However, the welfare analysis leads
exactly to the same qualitative conclusions. Another sensitivity analysis would consist in
lowering the ratio
κT,n
κn . Figure 13 features the consequences of an important improvement
in the eﬀectiveness of training schemes as this ratio amounts now to 0.5 (instead of 0.85).
As far as labor market indicators are concerned, Figure 13 is qualitatively similar to but
quantitatively diﬀerent from Figure 12 (look e.g. at wl) . Furthermore, even if it is still
declining with γ, the level of tightness θT,n is now much higher for both skill groups.
This really boosts search eﬀort levels sT,n. When γ is increasing, all tightness indicators
are declining at a similar pace but search eﬀort levels are more rapidly declining for
the low skilled. This diﬀerence explains why intertemporal utility levels of the low and
the high skilled people now vary in opposite directions. In sum, if training programs
substantially reduced ﬁrms’ training costs, labor market indicators would still be better
without them. In addition, the favorable eﬀects on the welfare of the low skilled would
come from diﬀerences in the pace of decline of search eﬀort levels when the rate of entry
into training rises.
4 Conclusion
This paper has developed an equilibrium matching model with six labor market states
(inactivity, insured unemployment with two distinct levels of beneﬁts, participation to
27vocational training, employment and employment after a training spell). This model
is fairly general and could therefore be used to evaluate labor market policies in many
countries. In this model, workers are risk averse and heterogeneous in skill, job-search
is endogenous in each state, a state-speciﬁc parameter aﬀects matching eﬀectiveness and
wages are endogenous via a bargaining framework. Training programs do not only improve
the fall-back position of the workers. They also reduce the cost that ﬁrms incur when they
recruit workers. These hiring costs are distinct from the cost of posting vacancies and
screening applicants. This paper has shown that the steady-state equilibrium is unique.
Under certain conditions, this property also holds when tax rates are endogenous.
Analytical properties are numerous. Under certain conditions that are more stringent
in the presence of a two-tired beneﬁt system, training programs have a positive direct eﬀect
on the employment rate. However, their indirect eﬀects are detrimental to employment.
The rate of entry into training programs not only increases equilibrium net wages and
decreases tightness. It also reduces the equilibrium levels of job-search. A two-tired
unemployment beneﬁt structure has properties already studied by Cahuc and Lehmann
(2000) and Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) in general equilibrium matching frameworks.
This paper has focused on the interaction between such a structure and training programs.
A short expected period in the high beneﬁt state and a low rate of entry into training
schemes should be recommended if one intends to raise the employment rate through a
more diﬀerentiated proﬁle of unemployment beneﬁts. Another contribution of this paper
has been to merge the literature about the optimal sequencing of beneﬁts and the one
about sanctions. It has been assumed that the expected length of the period during which
high beneﬁts are received can be inﬂuenced by search eﬀort. It has then been shown that
the advantages of such a reform heavily depend on its eﬀect on search eﬀort because the
other impacts turn out to be negative.
Many net eﬀects cannot be signed and a normative analytical analysis is hard to con-
duct. Therefore, this paper has also developed a simulation exercise. The calibration has
been based on an extensive and well-informed use of statistics and studies for Belgium. In
this country, duration dependence is very strong but essentially spurious. The simulation
exercises deal with the ﬁnancing of the reforms. Simulation results strongly emphasize the
importance of the choice of the evaluation criterion. Indeed, performance indicators of the
labor market and welfare criteria often move in opposite directions after a reform, in par-
ticular because the latter takes care of the disutility of job-search eﬀort. This questions the
widespread focus on labor market indicators to guide the design of institutional reforms.
The simulation exercise conﬁrms the conclusion of Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) ac-
cording to which a declining time proﬁle of beneﬁt payments dominates a scheme with
a constant replacement ratio. However, if this is feasible, the two-tired beneﬁt structure
should be skill-speciﬁc since the optimal expected length of payment of high beneﬁts can
vary a lot in the population. For low-skilled workers with gloomy employment perspec-
tives, this optimal length amounts to 2.5 years in the simulations. A reform that would
relate this expected length to search eﬀort does not appear to produce substantial eﬀects
on any of the evaluation criteria. For the low-skilled, “front loading” the beneﬁt system is
28favorable to employment but is detrimental to their welfare. Microeconometric evaluation
has shown that Belgian vocational training schemes improve the exit rate of the treated.
In a setting where training programs reduce hiring costs, a moderate wage-push eﬀect is
conﬁrmed when tax rates and the levels of unemployment beneﬁts are ﬁxed. Moreover,
training programs aﬀect negatively and strongly the level of search eﬀorts of the unem-
ployed. Eventually, training schemes reduce the employment-active population ratio in the
presence of a two-tired beneﬁt system. This property is however reversed when beneﬁts
are constant all along an unemployment spell. This indicates that the impact of active
programs can be deeply aﬀected by the design of passive policies and that this can happen
in a way which is not the expected one (Coe and Snower, 1997). When the ﬁnancing of
training schemes is taken into account and replacement ratios are constant, the wage-push
eﬀect is more than compensated by the impact of higher tax rates. Simulations then show
that nearly all the evaluation criteria worsen when more unemployed people enter train-
ing schemes. Despite their microeconomic favorable eﬀects on the hiring rate, vocational
training for the unemployment appears to have harmful net eﬀects in Belgium. It should
be emphasized that this paper has not dealt with programs covering possibly several years
and intending to lift the productivity of the unemployed. Since microeconometric evalu-
ation suggests that standard (and relatively shorter) programs do not have such eﬀects,
this paper has only dealt with training schemes that reduce ﬁrm-speciﬁc training costs
and possibly improve the matching eﬀectiveness of the participants.
Appendix 1. Proof of Proposition 1
Let us prove that VU,n >V X,n.I fVU,n was lower or equal to VX,n and sU,n was optimally
chosen by each unemployed, the following inequalities would hold:
rVU,n =ln(bU,n) − ψn
(sU,n)ξn
ξn
+ cnsU,nα(θn)(VE,n − VU,n)+γn(VT,n − VU,n)




+ cn sX,nα(θn)(VE,n − VU,n)+γn(VT,n − VU,n)




+ cn sX,nα(θn)(VE,n − VX,n)+γn(VT,n − VX,n)
=rVX,n,
which leads to a contradiction. Therefore, VU,n >V X,n.
Similarly, if VU,n was higher than VT,n and sT,n was optimally chosen by the trainee, the
29following inequalities would be veriﬁed:
rVT,n = ln(bT,n) − ψn
(sT,n)ξn
ξn
+ cT,nsT,nα(θT,n)(VE,n|T − VT,n)+λn(VU,n − VT,n)
≥ ln(bT,n) − ψn
(sU,n)ξn
ξn
+ cn sU,n α(θT,n)(VE,n|T − VE,n + VE,n − VU,n + VU,n − VT,n)
+( λn − γn + γn)(VU,n − VT,n)
> ln(bU,n) − ψn
(sU,n)ξn
ξn
+ cn sU,n α(θT,n)(VE,n|T − VE,n + VE,n − VU,n) (48)
+ γn(VT,n − VU,n).
From (8) and (9) and the assumption that wT,n ≥ wn, one has VE,n|T−VE,n =
ln(wT,n)−ln(wn)
r+φn ≥
0. Therefore, assuming that θT,n ≥ θn and knowing that VU,n >V X,n, expression (48) leads
to:
rVT,n > ln(bU,n) − ψn
(sU,n)ξn
ξn
+ cn sU,n α(θn)(VE,n − VU,n)+γn(VT,n − VU,n)
+( π0 − π1 sU,n)(VX,n − VU,n)=rVU,n,
which leads to a contradiction. So, VT,n >V U,n.
Appendix 2. Proof of Proposition 2
From (6) and (7), the marginal impact of φn,s T,n,s U,n,s X,n,c T,n,c n,θ n and θT,n should








πn(cT,nsT,nα(θT,n)+λn + γn)cn(sU,n − sX,n)α(θn)
+( πn + cnsX,nα(θn)+γn)
 
(cnsX,nα(θn)+γn)(cT,nsT,nα(θT,n) − cnsU,nα(θn))
+ πn(cT,nsT,nα(θT,n) − cnsX,nα(θn))
  
≥ 0i f cT,nsT,nα(θT,n) is suﬃciently larger than cnsU,nα(θn) and cnsX,nα(θn)









+ πn(cnsX,nα(θn) − cT,nsT,nα(θT,n))
 
≤ 0i f cT,nsT,nα(θT,n) ≥ cnsU,nα(θn) and cT,nsT,nα(θT,n) ≥ cnsX,nα(θn)







[cT,nsT,nα(θn)+λn + γn][cn sX,nα(θn)+γn]











Appendix 3. Proof of Proposition 3
∂WS
∂θn > 0 because the derivative of the terms between large brackets are positive (since
α (θn) > 0 and ∂V
∂θn > 0) and the derivatives of the other terms can be rewritten as
(r+cT,nsT,nα(θT,n)+λn)πncnsX,nα (θn)
∆2,n∆3,n (VU,n−VX,n). Totally diﬀerentiating (38) yields ∂WS
∂sι =0
for ι = {T,n},{X,n},{U,n},n ∈{ l,h}. This results has been established by Fredriks-







(VE,n−VT,n) > 0 by proposition 1 in the case whereVE,n|T = VE,n.
The marginal impact of the bι’s is obvious from the deﬁnition of the vι ( for ι = {T,n},{X,n},
















[r + cT,nsT,nα(θT,n)+λn][r + γn + cnsX,nα(θn)]
∆2,n∆3,n







The partial derivatives with respect to kn,κ n,β n,φ n,τ 0,n and κT,n are immediately derived
from the properties of V.
Appendix 4. The case of an isoelastic utility function of consumption
If ln(C) was replaced by Cζn





















= ˜ WS(wn,θ n,θ T,n,s T,n,s U,n,s X,n | Zn,τ 0,n,B n) ≡



























After substitution of function T , Equation (40) becomes then



















One modiﬁcation should be introduced in Equations (42),(43) and (44), namely function
V(·) is replaced by w
ζn
n V(·).
Appendix 5. The budget constraint of the State and the uniqueness of
equilibrium
Assume that τ0,n = 0 and also that the net replacement ratios are constant (e.g. ρU,n =
bU,n/wn). Let Rn designate the vector of net replacement ratios with R =( Rh,R l). Let
also L =( Lh,L l). Equation (45) implies that at least one of the marginal tax rates has
to become endogenous. In Section 3, both tax rates are assumed to vary proportionately.
Rearranging (45), both marginal tax rates can then be written as functions of the rate of
individuals in the various states, say
τ1,n = gn(en + eT,n,u n,x n,t n |R ,L,Q,C),n∈{ h,l}. (55)
Obviously, τ1,n increases with the rates un,x n,t n and decreases with the employment rate.
Adapting (40), equilibrium tightness is now potentially a function of these rates:
F(θn,s T,n,s U,n,s X,n | Zn,0,g n(en + eT,n,u n,x n,t n |R ,L,Q,C),R n · wn)=0 , (56)
with wn = VS(θn | κn,k n,y n,r,φ n,0,g n(en + eT,n,u n,x n,t n |R ,L,Q,C)). Totally dif-
ferentiating (56) and making use of (38) and (40) lead to dF




du n = dF
dx n = dF
dt n = 0. Hence, equilibrium tightness is not a function of en+eT,n,u n,x n,t n.
Furthermore, the functions Σ are independent of τ1,n. Therefore, the levels of equilibrium
search eﬀort are not inﬂuenced by (55). These properties and the proof of Proposition 6
allow to conclude that the equilibrium is unique if τ0,n = π1 = 0, the replacement ratios
are constant and τ1,n is adjusted to clear the budget of the State.
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36parameter sU,n | θn˚ sU,n* sX,n | θn‡ sX,n* sT,n | θn,θ T,n† sT,n*
if π1 =0
bU,n 0i fπ1 =0 - + ? + ?
+i fπ1 > 0
bX,n 0i fπ1 =0 - - - + ?
-i fπ1 > 0
bT,n 0 - 0 - - -
π0 0i fπ1 =0 + - ? - ?
-i fπ1 > 0
π1 + ? + ? + ?
γn 0i fπ1 =0 - - - + ?
-i fπ1 > 0
λn 0 + 0 + + +
φn + ? + ? + ?
κn + ? + ? + ?
κT,n 0 + 0 + 0 +
kn + ? + ? + ?
yn 0 +i fτ0,n ≥ 0 0 +i fτ0,n ≥ 0 0 +i fτ0,n ≥ 0
0 ?i fτ0,n < 0 0 ?i fτ0,n < 0 0 ?i fτ0,n < 0
τ0,n,τ 1,n 0 - 0 - 0 -
βn + ? + ? + ?
˚ i.e. sU,n solving ΣU(θn,s U,n,s X,n,s T,n | Zn)=0 .
‡ i.e. sX,n solving ΣX(θn,s U,n,s X,n,s T,n | Zn)=0 .
† i.e. sT,n solving ΣT(θn,θ T,n,s U,n,s X,n,s T,n | Zn)=0 .
* means that the adjustment of θn (and θT,n) in equilibrium is taken into account.
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Figure 1: Labor market ﬂows.
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Figure 2: Simulations of an increase in π0 when the budget constraint of the State is
ignored; γn = 0. Scale on the horizontal axis: 100 ∗ π0.
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Figure 3: The impact of π0 from a utilitarian
point of view when r =0 .006 and tax rates
are endogenous. Scale:100 ∗ π0.











Figure 4: The impact of π0 on the low-skilled
unemployed when r =0 .006 and tax rates
are endogenous. Scale:100 ∗ π0.








Figure 5: The assumed evolution of unem-
ployed beneﬁts (n = l).










Figure 6: The evolution of search eﬀort
among the low-skilled.








Figure 7: The evolution of the low-skilled
employment rate.







Figure 8: The evolution the low-skilled in-
tertemporal utility levels measured in cer-
tainty equivalents (jobless individuals).
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Figure 9: Simulations of an increase in π1 when the tax rates τ1,n are adjusted to keep the
budget of the State balanced; γn = 0. Scale on the horizontal axis : 100 ∗ π1.
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Figure 10: Simulations of changes in γ keeping beneﬁts and tax rates unchanged; πn =
0.0833. Scale on the horizontal axis : 100 ∗ γ
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Figure 11: Simulations of changes in γ keeping beneﬁts and tax rates unchanged; πn =0 .
Scale on the horizontal axis : 100 ∗ γ
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Figure 12: Simulations of changes in γ when the tax rates τ1,n are adjusted to keep the
budget of the State balanced; πn =0 .0833. Scale on the horizontal axis : 100 ∗ γ
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Figure 13: Sensitivity analysis: Simulations of changes in γ if
κT,n
κn drops from 0.85 to 0.5.
The tax rates τ1,n are adjusted to keep the budget of the State balanced and πn =0 .0833.
Scale on the horizontal axis : 100 ∗ γ
44